Proportional cost for punishment enhances spatial reciprocity in evolutionary games
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Publication:336273
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.07.016zbMATH Open1348.91039OpenAlexW2065189467MaRDI QIDQ336273FDOQ336273
Authors: Jiang-Sheng Luo 
Publication date: 10 November 2016
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.016
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Cites Work
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games
- Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas
Cited In (7)
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Impact of multi-step punishment on the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
- Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
- Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
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