Cooperation risk and Nash equilibrium: quantitative description for realistic players

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2018.09.194OpenAlexW2784814441WikidataQ129138064 ScholiaQ129138064MaRDI QIDQ2155402FDOQ2155402

Authors: G. S. Contesini, Alexandre S. Martinez, Gilberto Medeiros Nakamura 

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.06505

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorycomplex systemphase transitionspotential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Non-cooperative games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Potential games
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• The evolution of cooperation
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• Positive interactions promote public cooperation
• Pavlovian prisoner's dilemma-analytical results, the \textit{quasi}-regular phase and spatio-temporal patterns
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary potential games on lattices

Cited In (1)

• Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception

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