Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise

DOI10.1007/BF01074955MaRDI QIDQ688536zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David Kraines, Vivian Kraines

Publication date 10 January 1994

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074955

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites work

• A New Estimator of Sensitivity Measures for Simulations Based on Light Traffic Theory
• Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• The evolution of cooperation
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma

Cited in

(16)

• A theoretical analysis of temporal difference learning in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
• Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
• Pavlovian prisoner's dilemma-analytical results, the \textit{quasi}-regular phase and spatio-temporal patterns
• Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
• Evolution of altruism in spatial prisoner's dilemma: intra- and inter-cellular interactions
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Empty nodes affect conditional cooperation under reinforcement learning
• Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with single and multi-behaviors: a multi-agent application
• Hidden patterns of reciprocity
• EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA
• Three steps ahead
• An intelligent agent model
• Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk
• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
• The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions

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