Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
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Publication:1906710
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1048zbMath0840.90135OpenAlexW2104569398MaRDI QIDQ1906710
Immanuel M. Bomze, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 6 February 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1048
Lyapunov stabilityreplicator dynamicsneutral stabilityevolutionary game theoryevolutionarily stable strategy
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, (L^p, l^p), etc.) in control theory (93D05)
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