Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
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Publication:1906710
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1048zbMath0840.90135MaRDI QIDQ1906710
Immanuel M. Bomze, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 6 February 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1048
Lyapunov stability; replicator dynamics; neutral stability; evolutionary game theory; evolutionarily stable strategy
92D15: Problems related to evolution
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
93D05: Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, (L^p, l^p), etc.) in control theory
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