Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.10.031zbMath1397.92746OpenAlexW2014147282WikidataQ48030933 ScholiaQ48030933MaRDI QIDQ1786988

Erol Akçay

Publication date: 26 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.10.031

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorymechanism designprivate informationhonest signalingparent-offspring conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

PDEs in connection with biology, chemistry and other natural sciences (35Q92) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Cites Work

• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

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