Cooperation in the short and in the long run

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90010-CzbMath0751.90023OpenAlexW2079105382MaRDI QIDQ1192641

H. Peyton Young, Dean P. Foster

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90010-c

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationlong-run behavior of economic and biological processesrepeated Prisoner's Dilemmastochastic influences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (14)

Selection of opponents in the prisoner's dilemma in dynamic networks, an experimental approach ⋮ Informational differences and learning in an asset market with boundedly rational agents ⋮ Genetic models in evolutionary game theory: the evolution of altruism ⋮ The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions ⋮ Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game ⋮ Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Long-run selection and the work ethic ⋮ Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition ⋮ The evolution of social and economic networks.

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Models of the evolution of altruism
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Unnamed Item

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