Long-run selection and the work ethic

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.007zbMATH Open1134.91368OpenAlexW3121812189MaRDI QIDQ926899FDOQ926899

Jens Josephson, Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/745

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionstochastic dynamicspublic goodswork ethic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Which one should I imitate?
• Cooperation in the short and in the long run
• Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

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