Evolution in games with a continuous action space

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8zbMath1166.91008OpenAlexW2292418659MaRDI QIDQ1014320

Matthijs van Veelen, Peter Spreij

Publication date: 27 April 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic stabilityevolutionary stabilitylocal superiorityPolish action spaceuniform invasion barriervicinities and neighbourhoods of strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (15)

Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Independent random matching ⋮ Evolution and the ultimatum game ⋮ Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games ⋮ Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations ⋮ Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ The replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces: finite approximations

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• Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
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• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

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