Evolution in games with a continuous action space
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Publication:1014320
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8zbMath1166.91008MaRDI QIDQ1014320
Peter Spreij, Matthijs van Veelen
Publication date: 27 April 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8
asymptotic stability; evolutionary stability; local superiority; Polish action space; uniform invasion barrier; vicinities and neighbourhoods of strategies
91A22: Evolutionary games
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