A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES
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Publication:3560097
DOI10.1142/S0219198909002467zbMath1190.91070MaRDI QIDQ3560097
Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, Dimitris Voliotis
Publication date: 19 May 2010
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002467
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
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