Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1zbMATH Open1182.91011OpenAlexW1662444935MaRDI QIDQ1034036FDOQ1034036
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Publication date: 10 November 2009
Published in: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1
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