A parametrization of the auction design space

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0828zbMath1103.91339OpenAlexW2028556886WikidataQ62636519 ScholiaQ62636519MaRDI QIDQ5938628

William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/287f9a2281e6560efce95ead464df9090e959c13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Emerging multiple issue e-auctions ⋮ Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters ⋮ Combinatorial auctions ⋮ Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling ⋮ TACtic- A Multi Behavioral Agent for Trading Agent Competition ⋮ DECLARATIVE SPECIFICATION OF FAULT TOLERANT AUCTION PROTOCOLS: THE ENGLISH AUCTION CASE STUDY ⋮ Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions

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• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
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• Incentives in Teams

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