Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.001MaRDI QIDQ6494251zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Tatiana Mayskaya, Arina Nikandrova

Publication date 30 April 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

Brownian motiondelegationlearningmisspecified modeloverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Delegating trial and error
• Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning
• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Overconfidence and ethical contracts

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3607222 (Why is no real title available?)
• Human decisions and machine predictions
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• The First Passage Problem for a Continuous Markov Process
• Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning

Cited in

(3)

• Investment timing, agency and overconfidence
• Delegating trial and error
• Overconfidence and ethical contracts

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