Strategic sample selection

DOI10.3982/ECTA17288MaRDI QIDQ5860033zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen

Publication date 18 November 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17288

zbMATH Keywords

accuracyauctionscomparison of experimentsdesign of experimentsexaminee choiceinformation aggregationperemptory challengepersuasionstrategic selectionwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(11)

• Evaluating sampling strategy under two criteria
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Inference on Winners
• Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
• Attributes: selective learning and influence
• Testing under information manipulation
• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
• Communication in the shadow of catastrophe
• Optimal screening with securities
• Information orders in screening problems

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