Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9579-3MaRDI QIDQ1707540zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Flip Klijn, Marc Vorsatz

Publication date 3 April 2018

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10261/142799

zbMATH Keywords

game theorylaboratory experimentsocial preferencesoutsourcingshortest-first policysocial costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis
• Coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems
• Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers
• Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
• The price of anarchy in supply chains: quantifying the efficiency of price-only contracts

Cited in

(2)

• Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers
• Individual decision making in a negative externality experiment

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