Coordination in an email game without ``Almost common knowledge

DOI10.1023/A:1021180407318zbMATH Open1030.91004OpenAlexW1569224778MaRDI QIDQ1868486FDOQ1868486

Authors: Nicola Dimitri 

Publication date: 27 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021180407318

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zbMATH Keywords

mediationinformationefficiencycommunicationcoordinationknowledgegamesrisk-dominancechoiceemail

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cited In (7)

• How much common belief is necessary for a convention?
• Correlation in the multiplayer electronic mail game
• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Efficient communication in the electronic mail game
• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

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