Correlation in the multiplayer electronic mail game

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1576MaRDI QIDQ2867500zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter A. Coles, Ran Shorrer

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://scholar.harvard.edu/ran/node/89381

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcoordinationsignalingstag huntelectronic mail game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(2)

• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Coordination in an email game without ``Almost common knowledge

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