Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.05.008zbMATH Open1197.91072OpenAlexW2054338434MaRDI QIDQ844934FDOQ844934

Julian Rode

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2307/1/dp08_04.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

trustcompetitionexperimental economicsasymmetric informationsubjective beliefsautomatic information processingcontext effectstruth telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Subjective games and equilibria
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies*
• DO LIES ERODE TRUST?
• Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: an experiment on the effects of promises

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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