Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
DOI10.3390/G7030019zbMATH Open1406.91026OpenAlexW2484097814MaRDI QIDQ725019FDOQ725019
Authors: Mitsuhiro Nakamura, Hisashi Ohtsuki 
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030019
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Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Decision theory for games (91A35) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Planning and acting in partially observable stochastic domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
- The calculus of selfishness.
- The evolution of cooperation
- Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
- Automata, repeated games and noise
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
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