Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5918697
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-86772-0_24MaRDI QIDQ5918697
Érik Martin-Dorel, Pierre Pomeret-Coquot, Hélène Fargier
Publication date: 15 June 2022
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86772-0_24
68T37: Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence
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