The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.06.005zbMATH Open1180.91046OpenAlexW2041319059MaRDI QIDQ1049232FDOQ1049232

Xiao Luo

Publication date: 8 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005

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zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgestable setsextensive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cited In (3)

• On the foundation of stability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

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