The supercore for normal-form games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.004zbMath1142.91312OpenAlexW1987615477MaRDI QIDQ869880

Ana I. Saracho, M. Concepción Larrea, Elena Inarra

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsubsolutionindividual contingent threat situationvon Neumann and Morgenstern stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games ⋮ Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
• Non-cooperative games
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games