The supercore for normal-form games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.06.004MaRDI QIDQ869880zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Concepción Larrea, Ana I. Saracho, Elena Inarra

Publication date 9 March 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

individual contingent threat situationNash equilibriumsubsolutionvon Neumann and Morgenstern stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
• Non-cooperative games
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(5)

• The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
• Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
• Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
• Homocores, cores and operational inefficiency in superadditive n-person games†
• Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames

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