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- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
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- Equilibrium binding agreements
- N‐person games in partition function form
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
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Cited in
(14)- Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
- The strategic cores \(\alpha , \beta , \gamma \) and \(\delta \)
- Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
- The supercore for normal-form games
- The gamma-core and coalition formation
- STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY
- Refinements of the -core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition
- A STRATEGIC CONCESSION GAME
- Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment-dominance relations
- On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games
- Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187062 (Why is no real title available?)
- The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the \(\alpha\)-core
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