Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0315-5zbMath1279.91044OpenAlexW1970271349MaRDI QIDQ361813

Michael Trost

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0315-5

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityepistemic game theorystrong rationalizabilityiterated deletion of strategy profilespreference-based type space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality ⋮ Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis ⋮ Dominance rationality: a unified approach

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