On Stalnaker's notion of strong rationalizability and Nash equilibrium in perfect information games
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Publication:1280575
DOI10.1023/A:1005090905103zbMath0921.90149OpenAlexW1500290532MaRDI QIDQ1280575
Klaus Nehring, Giacomo Bonanno
Publication date: 17 September 1999
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005090905103
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