AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE

DOI10.1142/S0219198914400027zbMath1312.91022MaRDI QIDQ5406292

Michael Trost

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic game theory; order independence; choice rule; iterative deletion procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

91A35: Decision theory for games

Related Items

The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules, Dominance rationality: a unified approach

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