AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
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Publication:5406292
DOI10.1142/S0219198914400027zbMath1312.91022MaRDI QIDQ5406292
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic
03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
91A35: Decision theory for games
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