On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.03.015MaRDI QIDQ2002344zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Michael Trost

Publication date 12 July 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2014/wp_2014_032.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

choice rulecommon beliefepistemic game theoryiterative deletion procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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Cites work

• Admissibility in Games
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
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• Common belief in approximate rationality
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• Fixed set theory for closed correspondences with applications to self-similarity and games.
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
• Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models
• Hierarchies of compact beliefs and rationalizable behavior
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
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• Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Statistical decision functions which minimize the maximum risk
• The language of game theory. Putting epistemics into the mathematics of games. With a foreword by Eric S. Maskin
• The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
• The Theory of Statistical Decision
• Variational Analysis

Cited in

(1)

• Choice structures in games

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