Pure Strategy Dominance

DOI10.2307/2951557MaRDI QIDQ5286050zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tilman Börgers

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2951557

zbMATH Keywords

expected utility maximizing strategiesundominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Decision theory for games (91A35) Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

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Cited in

(30)

• Lexicographic domination in extensive games
• Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• Rationalizability and logical inference
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria
• Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Rationalizability in general situations
• A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES
• Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players
• A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited
• Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
• Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
• Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games

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