Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1461253 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(18)- Iterated elimination procedures
- Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences
- On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
- Iterated regret minimization in game graphs
- Translucent players: explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas
- Market Exit and Minimax Regret
- Choice structures in games
- Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
- Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
- Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
- On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
- AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
- Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game
- Reasoning about rationality
- Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret
- Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
- Experiments with the traveler's dilemma: welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
- Reactive synthesis without regret
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