Belief consistency and trade consistency

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005zbMath1288.91166MaRDI QIDQ2437174

Dov Samet, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

type spaces; agreeing to disagree; common prior; Dutch books; no-trade theorems; belief consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A99: Game theory

91B60: Trade models

91B99: Mathematical economics

Related Items

Monologues, dialogues, and common priors, Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium, Agreeing to agree and Dutch books, Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors, Countable spaces and common priors

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