Belief consistency and trade consistency

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.005MaRDI QIDQ2437174zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

agreeing to disagreebelief consistencycommon priorDutch booksno-trade theoremstype spaces

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Trade models (91B60) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cites work

• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• Agreeing to disagree
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1432797 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(12)

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
• Countable spaces and common priors
• Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
• Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
• Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets (extended abstract)
• Monologues, dialogues, and common priors
• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Weak agreement and the properties of beliefs under ambiguity
• Computing a common prior

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