Belief consistency and trade consistency
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Publication:2437174
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.005zbMATH Open1288.91166OpenAlexW1965858144MaRDI QIDQ2437174FDOQ2437174
Authors: Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005
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Cites Work
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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- A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
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Cited In (7)
- Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Monologues, dialogues, and common priors
- Countable spaces and common priors
- Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
- Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
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