Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00061-1MaRDI QIDQ5954783zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lutz-Alexander Busch, Quan Wen

Publication date 2001

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00061-1

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrepeated gamesnegotiationsunobservable mixed actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs
• An extension of Rubinstein's negotiation game
• Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

Cites work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• The policy bargaining model

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7438566 (Why is no real title available?)
• Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
• Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences

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