Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00061-1zbMATH Open0989.91016OpenAlexW2004287706MaRDI QIDQ5954783FDOQ5954783

Authors: Lutz-Alexander Busch, Quan Wen 

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00061-1

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrepeated gamesnegotiationsunobservable mixed actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• Finitely Repeated Games
• The policy bargaining model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining

Cited In (4)

• Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games

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