Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00061-1zbMath0989.91016OpenAlexW2004287706MaRDI QIDQ5954783

Quan Wen, Lutz-Alexander Busch

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00061-1

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbargainingnegotiationsunobservable mixed actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences

Cites Work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• The policy bargaining model
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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