Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
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Publication:1327376
DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1025zbMath0801.90017OpenAlexW1966941334MaRDI QIDQ1327376
Publication date: 19 June 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1025
Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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