The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
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Publication:1928733
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014zbMath1254.91036MaRDI QIDQ1928733
Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa
Publication date: 3 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
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Cites Work
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
- Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
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- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames