Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly

DOI10.1007/s00712-019-00685-5zbMath1448.91143OpenAlexW2998709355WikidataQ126419580 ScholiaQ126419580MaRDI QIDQ2195247

Iacopo Grassi, Carlo Capuano, Riccardo Martina

Publication date: 8 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179418

zbMATH Keywords

litigationpatentscollusionentry gameforeclosingpatent portfolio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Patent portfolios and firms' technological choices

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Patent litigation and cross licensing with cumulative innovation
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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