Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly

DOI10.1007/S00712-019-00685-5MaRDI QIDQ2195247zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Carlo Capuano, Iacopo Grassi, Riccardo Martina

Publication date 8 September 2020

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179418

zbMATH Keywords

collusionentry gameforeclosinglitigationpatent portfoliopatents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Patent litigation and cross licensing with cumulative innovation
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames

Cited in

(4)

• Patent and entry deterrence
• Purchasing sleeping patents to curtail budget padding
• Patent portfolios and firms' technological choices
• A model of patent trolls

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