A note on peer effects between teams

DOI10.1007/S10683-008-9209-1MaRDI QIDQ2271099zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rupert Sausgruber

Publication date 6 August 2009

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9209-1

zbMATH Keywords

oOrganization of workpeer effectspublic good experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem

Cited in

(4)

• Matching with peer monitoring
• Team players: how social skills improve team performance
• How attitude certainty tempers the effects of faultlines in demographically diverse teams
• Asymptotically valid and exact permutation tests based on two-sample U-statistics

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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