Local perfection

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90118-9MaRDI QIDQ1098788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leo K. Simon

Publication date 1987

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90118-9

zbMATH Keywords

``Trembling hand perfectioncompact metric strategy setslarge strategy spaceslimit of equilibriaNash equilibriumnormal-form gamessolution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

We investigate solution concepts for normal-form games with large strategy spaces. ``Trembling hand perfection (THP) is extended to games with compact metric strategy sets. A Nash equilibrium is THP if it is the limit of equilibria in which agents face vanishingly small uncertainty. We refine THP by imposing some structure on the kind of uncertainty that agents face: a THP equilibrium is locally perfect if the uncertainty is ``predominantly local in nature, i.e., if agents' probability assessments assign, in the limit, an overwhelmingly large proportion of the total probability mass to events ``in the vicinity of the truth..

Recommendations

• Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
• Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• Continuity and equilibrium stability

Cites work

• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
• Bertrand price competition with differentiated commodities
• Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(12)

• Bertrand price competition with differentiated commodities
• Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Trembling-hand myopia and trembling-hand perfection
• Topological essentiality in infinite games
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
• Pledge-and-review bargaining
• Local and perfect semihoops
• BUYING LOCALLY
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 492713 (Why is no real title available?)
• Perfectness in locales
• Localized perfection
• Local Gröbner fans

This page was built for publication: Local perfection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1098788)