Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information

DOI10.1007/BF01212472MaRDI QIDQ1338096zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date 27 November 1994

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01212472

zbMATH Keywords

behavior strategiesexistence of equilibriumextensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete-time games (91A50)

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Cites work

• Dynamic games of innovation
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Representation and Approximation of Noncooperative Sequential Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games

Cited in

(4)

• On the existence of approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a game with incomplete information
• A partial characterization of a history-dependent, subgame-perfect equilibrium: the case of an exhaustible resource duopoly
• Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
• Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks

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