A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
- A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
- A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Game theory
- Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
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