A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0532-7MaRDI QIDQ431813zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matt Van Essen

Publication date 3 July 2012

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0532-7

zbMATH Keywords

Lindahl equilibriummechanism designpublic goodsstabilitysupermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism

Cites work

• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Cited in

(2)

• A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
• Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms

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