Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
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Cites work
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Cited in
(35)- Economic planning based on social preference functions
- Social welfare with incomplete ordinal interpersonal comparisons
- A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
- Maximal sensitivity under strong anonymity
- Bergson social welfare functions in applied welfare analysis
- Rawls and Bentham reconciled
- Rawls's maximin rule and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Peter J. Hammond
- An axiomatization of the mixed utilitarian-maximin social welfare orderings
- On weighted utilitarianism and an application
- Ranking distributions of an ordinal variable
- Making discrete sugeno integrals more discriminant
- When do utilitarianism and egalitarianism agree on evaluation? An intersection approach
- Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories
- Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
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- Welfare and efficiency in incomplete market economies with a single firm
- Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Resolution of the sec-max-product fuzzy relation inequalities system and its lexicographic minimum solution
- Axiomatic theories of utilitarianism and weak utilitarianism
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- Factual versus representational utilities and their interdimensional comparisons
- A new characterization of simple majority
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- Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
- Haves and have-nots: a theory of economic sufficientarianism
- Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis
- Capacity Refinements and Their Application to Qualitative Decision Evaluation
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- The utilitarian criterion, finite sensibility, and the weak majority preference principle
- Cardinal utility, utilitarianism, and a class of invariance axioms in welfare analysis
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