Economic planning based on social preference functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(81)90006-8MaRDI QIDQ1167048zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ki Hang Kim, Fred Roush

Publication date 1981

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(81)90006-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutioneconomic planninginterpersonal comparison of utilitiessocial preference functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Welfare Function Using "Relative Intensity" of Preference
• Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms

Cited in

(2)

• The optimal progressive income tax. The existence and the limit tax rates
• The publications of Ki Hang Kim

This page was built for publication: Economic planning based on social preference functions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1167048)