Rawls's maximin rule and Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.026zbMATH Open1396.91152OpenAlexW2417053969MaRDI QIDQ1670174FDOQ1670174

Authors: Kui Ou-Yang 

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.026

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zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremRawlsianismsocial welfare functional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
• A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
• A complete characterization of hierarchy

Cited In (6)

• Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility
• Generalized Rawlsianism
• A tale of two Rawlsian criteria
• How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: a history of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
• A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion

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