A complete characterization of hierarchy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.09.033MaRDI QIDQ1667900zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kui Ou-Yang

Publication date 31 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.033

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchysocial welfare functiondictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
• A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cited in

(5)

• Rawls's maximin rule and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Generalized Rawlsianism
• Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
• Hierarchical Unambiguity
• The Extended Low Hierarchy is an Infinite Hierarchy

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