A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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Publication:431217
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0693-3zbMath1245.91030OpenAlexW2048987283WikidataQ56114309 ScholiaQ56114309MaRDI QIDQ431217
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0693-3
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