Generalized Rawlsianism
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Publication:1704409
DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1083-3zbMATH Open1392.91066OpenAlexW4235640126MaRDI QIDQ1704409FDOQ1704409
Authors: Kui Ou-Yang 
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1083-3
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Cited In (11)
- Social welfare with incomplete ordinal interpersonal comparisons
- A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
- Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility
- Rawls and Bentham reconciled
- Rawls's maximin rule and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- An axiomatization of the mixed utilitarian-maximin social welfare orderings
- A tale of two Rawlsian criteria
- On measuring welfare `behind a veil of ignorance'
- The distribution problem and Rawlsian reasoning
- Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
- Universal social orderings: an integrated theory of policy evaluation, inter-society comparisons, and interpersonal comparisons
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