Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5MaRDI QIDQ1141566zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew McLennan

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingprobability measureArrow's impossibility theoremstrategy proofnessadditivity of powerallocation of powerbinary social welfare schemedecision schemesdecision superschememixed social welfare functionsParetian social welfare schemerandomized preference aggregationstrict social welfare scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(11)

• Social Choice Theory
• Fuzzy preferences and social choice
• Generalized Rawlsianism
• Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
• Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle
• Sophisticated preference aggregation
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
• On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
• An axiomatic theory of political representation
• Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

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