Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5MaRDI QIDQ1141566zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew McLennan

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5

zbMATH Keywords

additivity of powerallocation of powerArrow's impossibility theorembinary social welfare schemedecision schemesdecision superschememixed social welfare functionsParetian social welfare schemeprobability measurerandomized preference aggregationstrategy proofnessstrict social welfare schemevoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(13)

• An axiomatic theory of political representation
• On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
• Fuzzy preferences and social choice
• Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
• Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
• Generalized Rawlsianism
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
• Social Choice Theory
• Uncertainty in discount rate and aggregation of time preferences
• Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament
• Sophisticated preference aggregation

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