Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.04.006MaRDI QIDQ2275655zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taro Kumano, Masahiro Watabe

Publication date 9 August 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptance algorithmdominant strategy implementationmultiple equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(3)

• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
• Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts

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