Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies

DOI10.2307/2297566MaRDI QIDQ3775278zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter J. Hammond

Publication date 1987

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297566

zbMATH Keywords

hidden tradesmultilateral compatibilitymultilaterally incentive compatiblePareto efficient allocationsprivately informed agentssymmetric allocation in a continuum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(13)

• Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
• Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals
• Peter J. Hammond
• The global LeChatelier principle and multimarket equilibria
• Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
• Anonymity and individual risk
• Insurance contracts and financial markets
• Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
• Markets and contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784400 (Why is no real title available?)
• Constrained efficient markets for manipulation economies
• Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
• Implementation theory

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