Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9473-9zbMath1378.91056OpenAlexW2082528888MaRDI QIDQ893035

Javier Perote, Juan Perote-Peña, Marc Vorsatz

Publication date: 13 November 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9473-9

zbMATH Keywords

linear regressionstrategy-proofnessrobust estimationlaboratory experimentresistant line

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Statistical detection and classification of background risks affecting inputs and outputs

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• School choice: an experimental study
• The Resistant Line and Related Regression Methods
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

This page was built for publication: Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study