Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study
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Publication:893035
DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9473-9zbMATH Open1378.91056OpenAlexW2082528888MaRDI QIDQ893035FDOQ893035
Javier Perote, Juan Perote-Peña, Marc Vorsatz
Publication date: 13 November 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9473-9
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Cites Work
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Cited In (5)
- Detecting systematic anomalies affecting systems when inputs are stationary time series
- Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior
- Statistical detection and classification of background risks affecting inputs and outputs
- Analysis of regression in game theory approach
- Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
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