Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
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Publication:969481
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.12.029zbMATH Open1203.91203OpenAlexW2049720373MaRDI QIDQ969481FDOQ969481
Publication date: 7 May 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.029
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Cites Work
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
Cited In (9)
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Non-bossiness
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency
- Menu mechanisms
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
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