Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
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Cites work
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
Cited in
(13)- Incompatibility between stability and consistency
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- Menu mechanisms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4092750 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Non-bossiness
- Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: a single-peaked preferences investigation
- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
- Local non-bossiness
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Influence in private-goods allocation
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