The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
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Publication:732932
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Cites work
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Incentives in Teams
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Manipulation through bribes
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On cores and indivisibility
- On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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