The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
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Publication:732932
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.005zbMath1190.91055OpenAlexW1990290471MaRDI QIDQ732932
Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama
Publication date: 15 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.005
Related Items
Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
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